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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2005, Uganda’ government fundamentally shifted the direction of its microfinance (MF) 
policy. Hitherto it had focused on integrating MF institutions into the financial sector, 
allowing them to take deposits. Since 2005, it focuses on savings and credit cooperatives 
(SACCOs); with government funding of and ostensibly interfering in the SACCOs’ 
operations.   
This paper explores the reversal of policy direction, drawing on public choice theory. It finds 
that the shift of policy direction served the objectives of Uganda’s politicians to maintain 
political power, as it offered them an avenue to create loyalty through patronage. MF special 
interest groups – particularly development agencies – had chosen a strategy based on 
information and financial contributions that failed to incite politicians and to maintain 
univocal support from technocrats and MF practitioners.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Microfinance (MF) has been high on the development agenda of East Africa since the 1990s. 
Development agencies have supported technically and financially governments and central 
banks in drawing policies and regulations for Microfinance Institutions (MFIs).  
Between 1999 and 2005, Uganda gained international recognition for an MF policy that was 
centred on integrating the microfinance market into the financial sector. In particular, it 
incited non-government organisation (NGO)-MFIs to transform into central-bank-supervised 
and deposit-taking institutions (MDIs). Around 2006, Uganda’s neighbours Kenya and 
Tanzania enacted comparable legislative frameworks. Regarding savings and credit 
cooperatives, Tanzania and Kenya had created tiered regulations in 2003 and 2008 
respectively, while the same is still being discussed in Uganda.1 
Development practitioners emphasize that they seek to engage policy makers for ‘building 
favorable policy and regulatory frameworks’.2 In contrast to this emphasis on policy advice, 
there is nearly no literature on the political economy of microfinance.  
In 2005, Uganda’s government chose to reverse the direction of its MF policy. Yet, it had 
thus far been thought of as ‘state-of-the art’ by development agencies; having been shaped by 
some widely acknowledged members of the MF practitioner community. That shift of 
direction has neither been studied comprehensively by development agencies nor by scholars.  
The objective of this chapter is twofold. The first is to present the case of Uganda’s MF 
policy and its making in the 2000s and the shift of direction in the middle of that period. The 
second objective is to suggest an exploratory political economy-framework which draws on 
public choice theory.   
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical 
framework. Section 3 presents the case of Uganda’s MF policy since 1999, and its shift of 
direction in 2005. Section 4 interprets Uganda’s MF policy-making through the political-
economy-framework. It highlights how politicians, technocrats and MF special interest 
groups weighed their resources for influencing policy. While the latter relied on generation 
and provision of information, the former relied on financial and loyalty prospects. Section 5 
concludes with an outline of research questions that arise from the exploratory nature of this 
paper’s theoretical framework. 
2. THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
2.1 Introduction 
Political economy is the study of policy-making through the ‘lenses’ of economics. Policy 
making can be analysed with a two-stage principal-agent-framework. The electorate is the 
principal that chooses politicians as its agents; politicians are principals who work through 
technocrats as their agents. 3 Principal-agent-relationships are shaped by political and social 
institutions. These form the regime or ‘the rules of the game’.4  
2.2 Policy-makers and policy-making 
Politicians are usually modelled as agents who pursue political power. Political economy 
models vary with regard to the motives for political power as well as the means to pursue it. 
In any case it is realistic to assume, smart to presume, and justified to support the view that 
politicians pursue their own objectives and that these objectives differ from those of the 
citizen.5  
Special interest groups are defined broadly as any subset of voters who share concerned 
characteristics, or beliefs and interests.6 Special interest groups have a wide array of means to 
influence policy-making from the first draft until implementation.7  
Policy-making entails generating, enacting and implementing of policies.8 Policies are 
generated by politicians, technocrats or special interest groups. Each of them may (co-)author 
a platform, or a draft policy, or a bill. However, politicians and technocrats do not do so as 
individuals, but as agents of a broader interest. ‘In modern democracies, a politician is a 
spokesman for some broad-based opinion, and what he or she hopes to become is the holder 
of an office’.9  
When it comes to enacting and implementation of policy, political office holders rely on the 
technocrats employed by those offices.10 Analogous to politicians, technocrats pursue their 
own objectives. The landmark model of Niskanen suggests it to be maximization of budgets 
at the technocrat’s disposal.11  
2.3 Policy-making strategies 
Politicians, technocrats and special interest groups can choose different strategies to steer 
through those policy proposals that are closest to their objectives, and to fend off those policy 
proposals that conflict with their objectives. These strategies may be classified by the 
resources drawn on, including information, finance, and loyalty.  
Information-based policy-making strategies seek to generate and provide knowledge about 
the contents and expected effects of the policy. If policy-makers are well informed, they may 
be comfortable to act upon that information. However, the tasks of gathering and vetting 
information are costly. Therefore, policy-makers must decide which portion of their budget to 
allocate to the information tasks.  
Special Interest groups bear the cost of information to signal its credibility to politicians and 
technocrats.12 
Politicians and technocrats seek information from special interest groups who have tacit 
knowledge of the respective policy issue. ‘While such lobbying typically reduces the 
uncertainty facing a policymaker, it cannot eliminate it entirely. Importantly, in most cases, 
the sharing of information is beneficial to both the policymaker and the interest group. Even 
when two groups with disparate preferences lobby a policymaker, each group gains relatively 
from the outcome that would result from an uniformed policy choice’.13 Under the two-stage 
principal-agent framework, the same conclusion would apply to the interaction between 
politicians and technocrats with regard to tacit knowledge of administrative procedures.  
From the above concludes that no policy-maker has the financial or technical capacity to 
reduce information uncertainty to zero. That means that information is always incomplete. 
Politicians, technocrats and special interest groups, then, must choose which level of 
incompleteness of information is acceptable to them. Different academic fields suggest 
different approaches to that choice. Rational choice theory suggests risk management based 
on probability-based models. Behavioural theory suggests, based on models of human 
cognition that most people rely on heuristics and framing of selective information. ‘Story-
telling’ composes thus selected, incomplete information into a seemingly comprehensive 
narrative.14 Due to limitation of space, this paper discusses information-based strategies 
under the axiomatic assumption that uncertainty of information is negligible towards the 
outcomes of policy-making. The exploration of policy-making strategies based on incomplete 
information has to be left to a future paper.  
Finance-based policy-making strategies involve offering financial incentives in exchange for 
support to a given policy proposal. Politicians may request financial contributions for their 
election campaigns. It has been shown that special interest groups signal their preferences by 
paying voluntarily before a policy issue arises.15 Politicians could also impose access costs on 
special interest groups who wish to present their issues.  
Technocrats may expect political office holders to allocate increased budgets to them in 
return for smooth processing of a given policy. They may administratively delay policies that 
imply reductions of their budgets.16  
Technocrats are usually legally prohibited from accepting direct financial contributions from 
special interest groups. However, they can accept indirect expansion of their budgets, for 
example financing of departmental retreats and business trips.  
Special interest groups often include allocation of funding into the policy proposals they 
advocate for. Thus, enacting and implementing of their policy proposals is regularly linked to 
financial flows to the special interest groups.  
Loyalty-based policy-making strategies rely on people who have the right to vote on the 
policy or whose role is to take its formulation forward. It also relies on people who have the 
capacity to mobilise opposition or criticism against proposed policies but refrain from doing 
so. Thus, the political power of a politician depends on loyalty by people.17 However, it is 
important to note that loyalty to a policy and loyalty to a politician are different from each 
other. They may or may not be aligned. Political loyalty may be offered based on issues, 
performance, and identity.18 
Politicians generate loyalty through patronage, social capital or the use of aggression. 
Patronage is the exchange of offices or finance in exchange for support; it could also take the 
form of exchanging support for one policy for support for another policy.19 Some authors 
suggest that rewarding loyalty through patronage is more important for consolidating power 
than financial incentives.20  
Social capital emerges from a shared interest or from a shared identity. Shared interests or 
identity can create a network within which information and other transaction costs are 
reduced.21 By emphasising shared interests and identity, for example of rural or young 
populations or of people with the same ethnicity,22 politicians seek to invoke a bond with 
those sections of the electorate. It can be ‘capitalised’ as loyal voting behaviour, whereby the 
politician is elected regardless of the policies he pursues.  
Finally, loyalty can also be generated by intimidating opponents or rigging ballots. Other 
aggressive methods to generate loyalty include assassination, riots and guerrilla activity.23 
Use of aggression characterises semiauthoritarian or authoritarian regimes. 
3. MAKING MICROFINANCE POLICY IN UGANDA 
3.1  Uganda’s political regime since 1986 
Uganda, alongside Kenya, Rwanda and 21 other African countries has been characterised as a 
hybrid regime of semiauthoritarian nature while Tanzania has been categorized as semi-
democratic.24 ‘Hybrid regimes (both their semidemocratic and semiauthoritarian variants) are 
neither liberal democracies nor autocratic regimes; rather, they are situated along a spectrum, 
in between these two types’.25 The hybrid political system of Uganda was established in 1986 
under the leadership of Yoweri Museveni. Mr. Museveni had led the ‘National Resistance 
Movement (NRM)’ through guerrilla activity against Uganda’s authoritarian regimes of the 
1970s and 1980s.26  
Mr. Museveni has been president of Uganda since 1986; the NRM has ruled with an absolute 
majority since. Accordingly, Uganda’s politicians have mostly emerged from the NRM – and 
even the majority of those in the opposition are former protégés of the NRM. With 50 percent 
of the population aged fifteen years and below, generational change takes place among the 
lower ranks of politicians. 
3.2 Uganda’s economic policies between 1986 and 1999 
With regard to its macro-economic management, the NRM-led government had leaned 
towards interventionism in its early years. Since the first half of the 1990s it shifted its focus 
towards market-building.27 This shift was inspired by World Bank and IMF and led to the 
emergence of a strong technocracy in the central bank (Bank of Uganda – BoU).28 In 1992, it 
brought about the creation of the ministry of finance, planning and economic development 
(MoFPED) which was the result of a merger of the ministries of finance and of planning; the 
latter had been established in the 1960s.29  
Unlike its macro-economic policy, the micro-economic policies of the NRM-led government 
remained mixed, with both interventionist and market-building approaches. This is borne out 
by Uganda’s financial sector policies. Thus between 1988 and 1994, the government pursued 
direct credit provision through the country’s largest and government-owned bank.30 But the 
1990s saw a phase of liberal licensing which led to an increase in the number of regulated 
financial institutions (FIs).31 However, over the same period the government pursued three 
schemes for directed credit, two of which were administered through ministerial and local 
government offices.32  
At the end of the 1990s, Uganda’s regulated segment of the financial sector fell into a crisis 
that culminated in the closure of four commercial banks and demise of the largest and 
government-owned bank. In the aftermath of those events, BoU consolidated its position as 
the sole supervisor of FIs; MoFPED technocrats lost their stake in that budget.33 At about the 
same time, the government’s credit schemes failed due to poor administration and high 
default rates.34 
3.3 A market-building MF policy regime from 1999 to 2005 
Uganda’s market-building MF policy was based on a 1999 policy paper by the BoU.35 It 
followed a comprehensive campaign of NGO-activists and development technocrats and led 
to the MDI-act in 2003.36  
Most of these NGOs used compulsory savings as part of their lending model although some 
of them mobilized voluntary savings. However, they were legally prohibited from accepting 
deposits; that is savings from the public to be intermediated into loans. SACCOs are allowed 
to intermediate savings from their members (but not the public) into loans for their members.  
Development technocrats were involved in both shaping the growth of NGO-MFI operations 
and in influencing the development of related policy of the BoU and MoFPED. Table 1 
presents the building blocks and institutions that embedded Uganda’s market-building MF 
policy.  
Table 1: Building Blocks of Uganda’s Market-building MF Policy 
Item Type Year Role  
Core 
Documents 
Policy Paper  
 
199937 ‘supported the view of microfinance as a line of 
business and foresaw the initiation and creation of a 
four tiered financial structure’ (AMFIU, 2008:40) 
Cabinet Paper 1999 basically adopted the policy paper which had been 
authored by BoU 
MF Regulation 
Bill 
2000 based on its policy paper, BoU produced this draft bill 
which was widely debated at AMFIU, in the MF 
Forum and in parliament  
Cabinet Statement 2001 ‘it [Government of Uganda] had pulled out of direct 
delivery of financial services and would concentrate on 
improving the operational environment (policy regime) 
for private sector institutions to do the business’ 
(AMFIU, 2008:41) 
MF Deposit-
taking Institutions 
(MDI) Bill 
2003 emerged from the discussions between 2000 and 2003, 
when it was enacted by parliament  
 
MDI-regulations 
 
2004 The MDI-act authorised BoU to implement the 
regulation of MDIs, for which they stipulated 
regulations about licensing, reporting and performance 
requirements of the MDIs. MDI-licenses have been 
given on the basis of these regulations5 
Organi-
sations 
BoU Founded 
in 1966 
authored the MF policy paper and the MF Regulation 
Bill; licenses and supervises MDIs 
MoFPED Founded authored the MF cabinet paper and the cabinet 
in 1992 statement that supported a market-building direction; 
steered bill through parliament towards its being 
passed as MDI-Act; oversaw administrative unit that 
coordinated MF Outreach Plan 
Association of 
MFIs in Uganda 
(AMFIU) 
 
founded 
in 1996 
with active support of development technocrats, this 
member-based organisation became a major platform 
of the campaign for a change of the regulatory 
framework in Uganda  
MF Support 
Centre Limited 
(MSCL) 
Founded 
in 2003 
replaced earlier schemes through which government 
had directed credit; mandated to advance wholesale 
loans to MFIs by business performance principles, 
though at subsidized lending rates 
Frameworks MF Forum Founded 
in 1998 
a consultancy mechanism for debating and refining 
policy in which development technocrats were 
prominently involved  
MF Outreach 
Plan 
Founded 
in 2002 
‘a strategic plan for expanding the outreach of Micro-
finance into the rural areas [...] multi-
donor/government plan [...] based on [...] increased 
efficiency, commercial viability and market 
development for capacity building services’ 
(Kamuhanda and Tanburn, 2005:13) 
Sources: AMFIU (2006; 2008), BoU (2004), Godwin-Groen et al (2004), Kamuhanda and 
Tanburn (2005), Schmidt (2011).38 
3.4 An interventionist MF policy regime since 2005 
In the run-up to the 2006-parliamentary and presidential elections, NRM endorsed a platform 
of ‘Bonna Bagagawale’ (Prosperity for all). The minister of state in charge of microfinance 
(2005 to 2009), Caleb Akandwanaho39  was a leading protagonist of that platform and had his 
technocrats draw an MF policy of an interventionist spirit.40 Based on this framework, the 
government intended to channel all MF funds into the formation of ‘one SACCO per sub-
county’. Table 2 gives the building blocks and institutions that embed the interventionist 
policy. By June 2011, the Ugandan government supported 735 SACCOs nation-wide 
financially and technically.41  
Table 2: Building Blocks of Uganda’s Interventionist MF Policy 
Item Type Year Role  
Core 
Documents 
Manifesto of the 
NRM in the 
presidential and 
parliamentary 
elections  
2006 a multi-faceted development agenda for 
‘Bonna Bagagawale’(Prosperity for All), 
it endorses an interventionist economic 
policy; perceives microfinance as a ‘social 
service’ that should be available to every 
citizen; describes government’s role in 
microfinance provision as ‘creating and 
building a nationwide network of rural 
financial infrastructure’  
MF policy 2005 ‘translated’ objectives of ‘Bonna 
Bagagawale’ into guidelines for 
government policy; focus on SACCOs 
and the objective of forming ‘one SACCO 
per sub-county’ 
Organi-
sations 
MoFPED Founded in 
1992 
authored the MF policy paper that 
supported an interventionist direction; 
drafted an MF regulation bill that would 
bring SACCOs under its purview; 
oversees administrative unit that 
coordinates RFSP 
Uganda Credit and 
Savings 
Cooperative Union 
Founded in 
1972 
formally a member-based organisation, 
government through financial and 
personnel intervention shaped it to be the 
main implementing agency of RFSP; 
spearheads the formation of ‘one SACCO 
per sub-county’; supports young SACCOs 
with physical assets, staff salary subsidies 
and trainings 
MF Support Centre 
(MSCL) 
 The government shifted the criteria of 
MSCL lending from business performance 
towards political-administrative 
(SACCOs, including young and 
inexperienced ones); also included 
Farmers’ Marketing Cooperatives into the 
MSCL target group; set up an agricultural 
credit facility with an annual interest rate 
of 9 per cent, which requires SACCOs to 
retail agricultural credit at not more than 
13 per cent annually  
Frameworks The Rural Financial 
Services Program 
(RFSP) 
Founded in 
2007 
replaced the MF Outreach Plan; the 
coordinating unit for the interventionist 
policy, administering government funds to 
the cooperative union and its member-
SACCOs 
Sources: Akandwanaho (2007), AMFIU (2008), MoFPED (2005), RFSP (2009), Schmidt 
(2008)42 
4. EXPLAINING UGANDA’S MICROFINANCE POLICY MAKING  
4.1 Objectives of Uganda’s MF policy makers 
4.1.1 Politicians 
In terms of winning elections, Uganda’s ruling party and its politicians have been 
overwhelmingly successful. They won all national election since 1986 at a substantial 
margin. Their MF policy has added to that record in two main ways. 
First, during the presidential and parliamentary election campaign of 2001, the market-
building MF policy distanced the government from the failures of its directed credit schemes 
as well as from the failure of FIs. Furthermore, the process of implementing a market-
building MF policy required the active involvement of development agencies, through 
AMFIU and through the MF Forum. This was appreciated by the development agencies who 
described it as ‘best practice’.43 
Second, the presidential and parliamentary election campaigns of 2006 and 2011 were won 
by mobilising rural and first-time voters who constitute the majority of Ugandans. The 
interventionist MF policy appealed to these voters because it raised their expectations for a 
quick and tangible access to finance in the form of SACCO-loans. Moreover, young voters 
could hardly remember the failed directed credit schemes of the 1990s and were eager for the 
opportunities promised by ‘Bonna Bagagawale’.  
4.1.2 Technocrats 
The market-building MF policy served the interest of technocrats both at BoU and at 
MoFPED.  
BoU technocrats defended their consolidated role through pro-actively taking up the MF 
topic. At the same time, they were cautious to avoid the responsibility of supervising a large 
number of NGO-MFIs and SACCOs. Indeed, the technocrats were aware that they would not 
be able to effectively supervise all the NGO-MFIs and SACCOs. In the 1990s, they had 
experienced rapid growth in the number of financial institutions outpacing BoU’s supervision 
capacity. This had been a factor in the banking crisis at the end of that decade.44 Meanwhile, 
MoFPED technocrats expected their profile and budgets to rise with the growing number of 
development agencies.  
In 2005, MoFPED technocrats might not have been convinced of the new direction. On the 
one hand, they had professionally embraced the Rutherford and Robinson paradigms (see 
4.2.1). On the other hand, the interventionist policy increased the influence of politicians over 
spending decisions, as opposed to MF budgets being largely controlled by technocrats. This 
became particularly visible in MSCL, where a politician became chairperson of the board of 
directors and assumed managerial roles.  
However, MoFPED technocrats knew that BoU had expanded its staffing when its 
supervision function was strengthened with international funding. BoU-technocrats through 
their cautious MDI-licensing approach45 had signalled that they were not interested in taking 
responsibility for the vast number of non-regulated MFIs. Therefore, MoFPED-technocrats 
could assume that the change of MF policy would hand more staffing to them. This reasoning 
is borne out by the SACCO-regulation bill that has since been drafted and promoted by 
MoFPED.46 
However, that bill removes SACCOs from the oversight of the Ministry for Tourism, Trade 
and Industries. This ministry is responsible for the registration and, nominally, supervision of 
all cooperatives. Supported by cooperative activists, the technocrats of the Ministry for 
Tourism, Trade and Industries have since agitated for policies that delay the tabling of 
MoFPED’s SACCO regulation bills in cabinet.  
BoU-technocrats had hitherto been among the most critical of the new policy, and their 
resistance altered some of the elements included in the earlier proposal. These had concerned 
the role of government-owned Post bank, a BoU-regulated financial institution. The major 
focus of the new policy was on SACCOs, though, and those remain outside the realm of 
BoU.  
4.1.3 MF Special Interest Groups 
Special interest groups that advocate for MF policy in Uganda comprise of NGO- and 
cooperative activists, bankers and development technocrats. Most of them supported the 
market-building MF policy and were critical of the interventionist approach for a number of 
reasons.  
First, NGO-activists who work in internationally based NGO-MFIs (three of which later 
transformed into MDIs) were among the supporters of the market-building MF policy, 
because it provided them with career opportunities. For example, as the NGOs grew and 
transformed into MDIs, salaries increased and staff were also offered many training 
opportunities, often abroad. Moreover, the growth of MDIs opens many opportunities to their 
staff such as the chance to become branch or regional managers or even department heads.47 
Second, another interest group who supported the market-building MF policy were bankers 
who joined transforming NGO-MFIs or who organised MF ‘product lines’ in regulated FIs. 
Accordingly, they supported the market-building MF policy, because it created opportunities 
for their business and their careers.48  
However, not all NGO-activists remained supportive of the market-building MF policy. It 
was becoming clear towards the middle of the decade that many NGO-MFIs would not be 
able to transform into MDIs, as the market space was occupied and transformation funding 
was reducing.49 In NGO-MFIs that were struggling to transform into MDIs or to operate self-
sufficiently, NGO-activists experienced increasing job insecurity and stagnating 
opportunities. These NGO-activists realised that the interventionist MF policy might offer 
them better career opportunities, for instance by joining the cooperative union that distributed 
government funds to SACCOs, or by joining those SACCOs. Indeed, one NGO-MFI even 
abandoned its legal form and registered as a SACCO.  
Technocrats employed by development agencies that were subsidiaries of ‘donor countries’ 
were another group with interests in supporting market-oriented MF policy. At least nine bi- 
and multilateral development agencies supported financially and technically Uganda’s MF 
sector during the period of market-building. They were also active participants of the MF 
Forum and (some of them) have been the main funders of AMFIU. Most of them stopped that 
support after the shift to the interventionist MF policy. 
Cooperative activists, on the other hand, have divided interests and loyalties. Those working 
in large and operationally self-sufficient SACCOs were supporters of the market-building 
policy, because they did not wish politicians and government technocrats to interfere in their 
organisations. Members or staff of smaller SACCOs regularly supported the interventionist 
policy, because it created opportunities for them. In fact, many of these small SACCOs had 
been formed for the purpose of accessing government funding. The divide among cooperative 
activists is also visible at national level, were one cooperative association is strongly opposed 
to the interventionist MF policy, while another is its lead implementer (box 2).50 
4.2 Strategies adopted by Uganda’s MF policy-makers 
4.2.1 Information-based strategies 
NGO-activists and development technocrats were at the forefront of the evolution of 
microfinance as a knowledge field; notable are the ‘Robinson-paradigm’ and the ‘Rutherford-
paradigm’ The former proposed the view that MFIs should be financial service providers 
exclusively, rather than social service providers, or a mix of the two.51 The latter drew on the 
fact that until the 1990s, microfinance basically involved micro-credit only, and stressed the 
demand of poor people for savings.52 This implies, amongst other things, regulation of the 
industry.  
The Robinson and Rutherford paradigms informed MF policy-making in Uganda between 
1999 and 2005.53 However, when Uganda’s parliamentarians passed the MDI-bill in 2003, 
they also passed a resolution calling for additional government interventions towards the 
mostly rural SACCOs that were considered unlikely to transform into MDIs.54 This showed 
that the information provided by development agencies met with scepticism of many 
Ugandan politicians.  
In other words, Ugandan politicians accorded the market-building MF policy low credibility, 
despite the efforts of development technocrats, NGO-activists and bankers to provide 
supportive information. For most Ugandan politicians, the information they had or believed 
to have about the merits of interventionism enjoyed higher credibility. They felt that rural 
outreach of microfinance in Uganda expanded very slowly,55 and they embraced the promise 
of ‘Bonna Bagagawale’ to accelerate it. Consequently, in 2005 they embraced the change of 
MF policy toward interventionism.  
It is noteworthy that the financial support of development agencies and international NGOs 
appears to have added little credibility of the information they provided. This observation 
points to the scope of finance- and loyalty-based strategies.  
4.2.3 Finance-based strategies 
Donor countries contributed substantially to organisations and frameworks of the market-
building MF policy.56 However, most of this finance was not distributed through government 
agencies. It was provided to MFIs to finance expansion of their operations and their 
transformation into regulated FIs; much of it in form of technical assistance.  
Also, the budgets injected into the MF sector were small compared to the financial means 
provided to priority interest areas of the leading donor countries. Those are security and 
military spending.57 
If development agencies had translated their disagreement about the reversal of MF policy 
direction into reduced security and military spending, it would probably have outweighed the 
political gains expected from that reversal. However, the NRM-government had experience 
with ‘trade-offs’ of security/military policy against other fields of policy.58 They had reason 
to assume that the change of MF policy direction would not upset military priorities. Indeed, 
it did not.59 
4.2.3 Loyalty-based strategies  
Under the conditions of a semi-authoritarian regime, rewarding loyalty and retaining loyalists 
is likely to be the most important consideration of political power.60 Uganda’s three 
presidential elections since 2001 have been contested by an ‘illoyalist’; a former army officer 
who is also a former leading member of the NRM.61  
Furthermore, in 2005 Uganda held the first election under a ‘multi-party-regime’.62 In 
previous elections under the current constitution, the NRM was the only organisational 
platform allowed for campaigning. All other candidates were formally independent 
individuals.63 The multi-party-regime had been advocated for by international development 
agencies in a rather pushy way. Moreover, they were calling for reforms that would separate 
organisational structures of party and local government, which thus far had been de facto 
identical.64  
That meant that the objectives of the development agencies and the interests of the ruling 
politicians were in strong conflict. Maintaining political power meant to steer through that 
conflict, and at the same time assure loyalties, either through patronage or through means of 
aggression.  
Against this backdrop, the reversal of MF policy direction sent a message both to the 
government’s own followers and to the international development agencies. The message was 
that the NRM was standing up to defend its own interests, as opposed to being ‘pushed 
around’. Moreover, it created alternative avenues for patronage, as funding was channelled 
into young, small SACCOs which had often been created for that very purpose.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Between 1999 and 2005, development technocrats and NGO-activists successfully shaped 
Uganda’s MF policy through financial contributions and ‘state of the art’ information. Four 
NGO-MFIs transformed into MDIs under the market-building policy. Three MDIs are 
growing robustly, and in 2010 reached out to about 430,000 savers. The fourth MDI had over 
110,000 savers in 2008, when it was taken over by a commercial bank.65 
However, this information did not make a deep impression on Uganda’s politicians. Since 
1986, they had been informed that MF was a social service that makes loans available at 
highly subsidised interest rates. Accordingly, they can point to a phase of rapid SACCO 
growth between 2005 and 2008, resulting in over 800,000 savers reached in 2010.66 
Moreover, the interventionist policy aligned with their main objective and strategy. Those are 
to maintain political power through loyalty based on patronage. From this angel, the market-
building MF policy was an outlier which emerged from a strategy for political power rather 
than from ‘learned lessons’, as MF special interest groups liked to believe.67  
Furthermore, technocrats and MF-activists did not hold unanimous views on MF policy. 
Though most of them had supported the market-building direction, MoFPED-technocrats, 
and probably activists in some NGO-MFIs and in most SACCOs could expect the 
interventionist direction to align better with their interests.  
The analysis of Uganda’s MF policy regime in the 2000s offers insights for the provision of 
policy advice by development agencies and for the study of MF developments across 
countries. However, the exploratory nature of this political-economy-framework requires 
testing through further research. The hypothesis that information is relatively low priority as 
compared to finance- and loyalty-based strategies needs to be explored further. With the 
current dataset, the effects of different objectives and strategies on policy-makers and policy-
outcomes cannot be established authoritatively. This calls for further study, for example 
comprehensive interviews with those involved. Such studies would also allow exploring the 
role of information uncertainty, and how policy-makers deal with it. Last but not least, a 
systematic comparative approach would show why the MF policies in other East African 
countries were sequenced differently, for example regulating SACCOs before transforming 
NGOs.  
The case of Uganda’s MF policy emphasises the relevance of gaining deeper understanding 
of the political economy of its making; this paper proposes a starting point in terms of 
theoretical framework and in terms of empirical material.  
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